Abstract. This paper is based on the research result of Nguyen's attacking against DSA .We extent the Hidden Number Method (HNM) from the univariate modular polynomials with one order to the univariate modular polynomials with higher order. There are many crypto schemes using the arithmetical and truncate operations. If the constant terms are partly known, these schemes can be written as the modular equations. We analysis a scheme using the arithmetical and truncate operations so as to improve the lattice model. On the supposed condition, we can recover the basic key with the probability 99%.
Introduction
Hidden Number Problem was introduced by Boneh and Venkatesan [1] . It is an important application of the lattice in cryptography. They started to care the HNP in 1996. They mapped the HNP to a CVP and used LLL lattice reduction [2] together with Babai's nearest plane algorithm [3] to study the security of MSBs of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange and related schemes.
To attack 160-bit DSA given multiple signatures, Howgrave-Graham and Smart [4] applied some similar techniques with a fixed signing key and knowledge of some bits from each nonce. They could recover the secret key given 8 bits of each nonce from 30 signatures, but they did not succeed with 4 bits. Experiments were done using NTL [5] .
When the nonces are partially known, a provable polynomial-time was given by Nguyen and Shparlinski to attack against DSA [6] , under some assumption on the modulus and on the hash function. A 160-bit key was recovered with only 3 bits of each nonce from 100 signatures, and the NTL was used as well. Nguyen and Shparlinski also showed that in the given improved lattice reduction techniques, it should be possible to recover the key with only 2 nonce bits know and they extended their result to the ECDSA.
In this paper we extend the HNM of Nguyen's attacking against DSA. We use the HNM [7, 8] to solve the multivariate polynomials and give different lattice models. There exist many crypto schemes which are designed with the arithmetical operations and the truncate operations, such as IDEA, Salsa20, MD5, SHA0, SHA1, SPECK and so on. We give a general model to use our method in order to prove that the new method can be used not only in public key cipher but also in symmetric cipher such as block cipher and stream cipher.
Organization
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect.2, we introduce the basic conception of the lattice related to HNM. We describe the models used by Boneh and Venkatesan. In Sect.3, we construct the multivariate modular polynomials, give a general model of arithmetical and truncate operations and use the HNM to solve the modular polynomials. Sect.4 is summary.
Basic notations and results
In this paper, p is a prime number, p F is a finite field of p elements, 
For some absolute constant 0 C > . HNP and CVP [ 
spanned by the rows of the matrix:
The unknown vector 
Therefore, for each
For every fixed 
Our Results

The Principle
The principle of Nguyen's attacking against DSA is to solve the univariate congruence equation with one order. How about higher order?
Let the univariate congruence equation with higher order as follows:
p is a prime number, ... 2 mod . We will build the target vector and the lattice matrix as above.
Using the HNM in General Model of Crypto Schemes
For the congruence equation A , we can use the HNM to find the results, the experiments' results are as follows: Table 1 . Results of using the HNM to solve the congruence equations.
Order of equation
The minimum number of equation Probability of  success  1  3  100%  2  5  100%  3  7  100%  4  9  100%  5 11 100%
There exist many crypto schemes which are designed with the arithmetical operations and the truncate operations, such as IDEA, Salsa20, MD5, SHA0, SHA1, SPECK and so on. If we know some bits of them, we will use the HNM to attack them and recover the basic key. We give a general model of the arithmetical operations and the truncate operations, we construct the lattice matrix model and use the HNM to solve the modular polynomials. The probability of success is 99%.
The general model is as follows:
are generated by shifting register B. B is 128 bits and is cyclic shifted as 8 bits and 7 bits, and i Q is the i th 14 bits of B. [2, 5] and the number of the equations is 16, the probability of success is 99%.
Summary
In this paper, we describe the HNP, introduce the Hidden Number Method (HNM), and extent the HNM from the univariate modular polynomials with one order to the univariate modular polynomials with higher order. We construct a general model and solve the modular polynomials. The probability of success is 99%.
